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This disclosure relates to the field of anti-counterfeiting and counterfeit detection via physically embedded 
security codes. 
 
A system is disclosed which prevents counterfeiters from harvesting security codes using conventional code-
scanning technologies, forcing a counterfeiter to obtain or synthesize an exact copy of a physically rendered 
security code, making counterfeiting of security codes more difficult.  The disclosed system also enables the 
creation of apps designed specifically for security personnel that verify all levels of the marking, as opposed to 
a consumer-based solution that may only validate payloads before performing subsequent processing on a 
server. 
 
Conventionally, embedded security codes, such as barcodes or RFID tags, rely only on the uniqueness of the 
readable code payload to allow the detection of counterfeit objects on which the codes are embedded.  The 
problem with this is that counterfeiters can harvest the payload of authentic security codes using conventional 
code scanners, and this allows counterfeiters to easily create copies of authentic security codes, 
indistinguishable from the authentic security codes, merely by copying the payload into their own codes.  This 
makes the detection of counterfeiting difficult, and does not deter counterfeiting as well as the system 
disclosed below. 
 
The new approach embeds two levels of additional security/anti-counterfeiting information in the security codes 
in a manner that cannot be read by conventional code scanners. One embodiment is a QR code image with 
additional security/anti-counterfeiting information besides the standard QR payload embedded in the image. 
 
The first level of additional security/anti-counterfeiting information is a secure ID embedded in the padding of 
the QR code, which is reflected in the QR code image.  The padding of the QR code is ignored by conventional 
QR code scanning applications, so the secure ID cannot be easily read by counterfeiters hoping to harvest it.  
The secure ID is a set of bytes whose value can be generated randomly and stored separately, or it can be 
generated by applying a one-way hash algorithm (h1) to the payload to be embedded in the QR code. 
 
secureID = h1(payload) 
 
In the example in Fig. 1, a version 4 QR code with high error correction, which has 34 bytes in which to store 
the payload, has 24 bytes of payload and an 6-byte security ID encoded in the last 6 bytes of padding. 
 
Fig. 1: Encoding of a 6-byte security ID into QR code data 
34 bytes of total space 
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UUUU = Unused padding bytes (Payload could grow into these bytes) 
SSSSSS = Padding bytes used for SecurityID 
 
A special QR code scanning application can be created to read the normally-ignored padding bytes and extract 
the security ID.  If the security ID read from the padding bytes doesn’t match the hashed payload (i.e. 
h1(payload)), then we know that the QR code was created by a counterfeiter who generated the QR code from 
a harvested payload.  If the security ID read from the padding bytes does match the hashed payload, then we 
can move on to analyzing the second level of security/anti-counterfeiting information embedded in the QR code 
image. 
 
The second level of additional security/anti-counterfeiting information is public key features.  Public key 
features are a fine-grained digital representation of a combination of the payload and a public key that gets 
embedded into the security code.  The public key is a set of bytes whose value can be generated randomly 
and stored separately, or it can be generated by applying another one-way hash algorithm (h2) to the payload 
 
publicKey = h2(payload) 
 
Because of their fine-grained nature, public key features are difficult to copy or synthesize with enough fidelity 
to fool image scanning and analysis applications designed to look for authentic public key features. 
 
In the QR code example, the public key features could be represented as small changes to the normal QR 
code image.  The example in Fig. 2 is a QR code generated with public key features and a 6-byte security ID of 
0x1308C7C81C1A. 
 
Fig. 2: QR code image with an embedded security ID and embedded public key features 
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Specialized scanning and analysis applications can compare the actual public key features in the captured QR 
code image to the expected public key features in an authentic QR code with the same payload to create a 
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